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A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ in
Assisting the Pro Se Litigant
By Paris R. Baldacci*
Most literature regarding the role of adjudicators in assisting pro
se litigants is directed at trial judges presiding in state and federal
courts.' That literature and the reforms it envisions are based on a
critique of our lawyer-based adversarial litigation regime which is
bound - some might say hidebound - by formal rules of evidence and
procedure that effectively require representation by lawyers both for
access to its promise of a fair and impartial resolution of disputes and
* Paris R. Baldacci is a Clinical Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law. He was a member of the Task Force on Housing Court of the New
York County Lawyers' Association and the primary author of the Task Force's
Protocols and Best Practices for Housing Court Judges for Motions and
Trials/Hearings Involving Pro Se Litigants, which were adopted by the
Association's Board of Directors on December 4, 2006. He was Chair of the
Committee on Housing Court of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York from 1996 to 1999, and a member of the Association's Committee on the
Judiciary from 1996 to 2002. This article is a revision of his article Assuring
Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating
Their Cases in New York City's Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 659 (2006).
1. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in
Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City's Housing
Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 659 (2006) (and works cited
therein); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE
LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS
(1998) [hereinafter MEETING THE CHALLENGE]; Russell Engler, And Justice for All
- Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of Judges, Mediators,
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987 (1999); RICHARD ZORZA, THE SELF-HELP
FRIENDLY COURT: DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP To WORK FOR PEOPLE
WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002) [hereinafter SELF-HELP COURT]; Jona Goldschmidt,
The Pro Se Litigant's Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 36 (2002)
[hereinafter Litigant's Struggle].
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to be able to navigate its shoals.2 From the point of view of this
critique, these systemic and structural characteristics, exacerbated by
the passive role of the judge in such a system, deny pro se litigants
access to justice and, thus, present fundamental constitutional
challenges that must be met by our judicial system. 3 In searching for
alternative models to guide judicial reforms, much of this literature
looks enviously at the model of the administrative law judge ("AL")
who - at least in contrast to trial court judges - appears freed from
those elements of the adversary system described above, which most
commentators agree frustrate the full participation of pro se litigants
in our system of civil justice by silencing them in their attempts to
articulate legal claims and defenses.4
Thus, it is surprising to those of us who have been involved in
formulating this critique and in proposing reforms which, in many
instances, are based on the administrative law judge model, that ALJs
face many of the same challenges that trial court judges face in their
attempts to assist pro se litigants. An AU is also faced with charting
an ethical and effective course between a passive (adversarial) and an
active (inquisitorial) role, and fashioning formal and informal
procedures and techniques for conducting hearings involving pro se
litigants so that the pro se litigant is given a constitutionally adequate
full and fair hearing so that all information necessary to make a fully
informed decision is before the AL. In addition, the AU is faced
with accomplishing those tasks without prejudging the matter before
her and without appearing or, indeed, becoming partisan.
Nevertheless, ALJs are not necessarily more successful than trial
2. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 2069-70 ("The [evidentiary and
procedural] rules of the game were crafted by judges and lawyers. Litigants not
only have a right to appear without lawyers, but, in tremendous numbers of cases
every day across the country, are forced to appear in court without counsel through
no choice of their own. The lawyers and judges who establish the rules of the
game have no right to make it impossible or difficult for unrepresented litigants to
handle their own cases without forfeiting important rights for reasons unrelated to
the merits of the case."); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 36-42.
3. See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note I, at 667-68; MEETING THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 1, at 19-24.
4. See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 1, at 688-90 (and works cited therein)
(describing inapplicability of evidentiary rules in most administrative hearings and
the active role of ALJs in developing the record).
court judges in meeting these challenges.5 Accordingly, some of the
insights and techniques that have been developed in the critique of
the civil trial court system's failure to address the needs of the pro se
litigant may be of value to ALJs as they attempt to assist pro se
litigants who appear before them. Thus, I have sought to revise my
article on the role of New York City Housing Court Judges in
assisting pro se litigants6 so that the underlying research, analysis,
critique and proposed techniques in the Article might be brought to
bear on the particular challenges faced by ALJs at administrative
hearings involving pro se litigants.
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the problems faced by pro se
litigants in presenting their claims at administrative hearings and the
role of the AU in assisting them in meeting these problems. Part I
outlines what has become generally recognized to be the underlying
problems facing pro se litigants in most adjudicatory fora.7 Part II
then sketches a number of models and their theoretical bases by
which those problems can be addressed.
I. THE PROBLEM
At an administrative hearing, as in a trial in civil court, a pro se
litigant is thrust into the role of litigator within an adjudicatory
system that she does not understand, either procedurally or
substantively, and that effectively silences her. This dynamic is
apparent even in settings which are intended to be nonadversarial and
even in settings where the pro se's adversary is not present or
represented, such as at Social Security disability hearings. This
description and the analysis that follows are based on a few working
hypotheses which will be elaborated below:
1. Pro se litigants usually have only a very generalized
understanding regarding both the claims and defenses relevant to
5. Id. at 689 (and cases and works cited therein); see also, Phyllis E. Bernard,
The Administrative Law Judge as Bridge between Law and Culture, 23 J. NAALJ 1,
9-12 (2003)(describing "troubling deficits" regarding the way in which some Social
Security ALJs perceived their role as being similar to that of civil trial judges and
thereby reached unjust decisions).
6. Baldacci, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 1, passim.
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their cases and regarding how to present those claims or defenses to a
trier of fact.
8
2. The fundamental problem for pro se litigants in having their
claims or defenses heard is not primarily their lack of information or
understanding, but the structural dynamics in the evidentiary hearing
process which work to silence the pro se litigant even when she has
some knowledge regarding her legal claims or defenses.
9
3. The root cause of this systemic silencing may be, in part, a
slavish adherence to what is perceived to be the strictures of the
adversarial system, even in ostensibly non-adversarial settings,
including the resulting notions of the appropriate role of adjudicators
as passive, neutral arbiters in such a system.10
8. See MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 1; see also Barbara Bezdek,
Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in
Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992); Engler, supra note 1, at 1987-92;
SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 17-18. See generally Litigant's Struggle, supra
note 1. Although there has been less systematic study of the level of understanding
of pro se litigants at administrative hearings, there is no evidence to suggest that
they are any more sophisticated in their knowledge of procedural and substantive
law in that forum than their counterparts in trial courts. See, e.g., Manual for
Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAALJ 75-76 (2004) ("The ALJ often needs a
high order of skill to deal with the inexperienced pro se party, especially in
proceedings which structurally are more adversarial than Social Security disability
cases. The pro se party may never have been in a hearing room or courtroom
before.... [T]he pro se party may have a yen to 'play lawyer,' but is handicapped
by misunderstanding, fostered by the distortions of the popular media, about what
lawyers do, and how they do it.") [hereinafter Manual].
9. Bezdek, supra note 8, at 561-62 (finding tenants in Baltimore Rent Court,
an informal small claims forum, lost to landlord rent claims even when they had
knowledge of or could prove defenses to those claims); see also id. at 591 (noting
that poor tenants' relationship to law as one of subordination and not rights
"renders dubious proposals that information-delivery responses could remedy
dysfunctional conditions of the rent court's operation..... In other words,
knowledge of rights would not confer power. Our experience in the courthouse
suggests as much."); SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 18 ("practitioners report
that whatever resources are put into [providing pro se litigants with] information, in
the end many [pro se] litigants cannot be prepared to handle the courtroom with
information alone."). But see Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for the Pro Se
Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641,
1642 (1987) ("Experience has shown that providing general legal information to
pro se litigants can significantly increase their chances of success both in court and
in settlement negotiations.").
10. See, e.g., Bernard, supra note 5, at 11 (describing reports "that some
Whatever may be the root causes of this systemic silencing,
evidence of it is pervasive. In a seminal study of Baltimore's
informal small claims Rent Court, Professor Barbara Bezdek found
that even with an understanding of defenses and claims, including
having received advice and, in some instances, papers prepared by
attorneys to assist them, pro se litigants were systematically silenced
in that court. 11 Professor Bezdek identifies one element as key in
[Social Security] ALJs - a distinct minority - have attempted to preside over non-
adversarial adjudications as if they were standard court room litigation where the
neutral could stand passively on the sidelines and still justice would be done.");
Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 41:
[Despite the modem trend toward a more active role for judges,]
adversary theory requires the judge to remain passive until the
conclusion of the advocates' presentations. He is not free to
conduct an independent inquiry or otherwise accelerate the pace
of the proceedings ... [this passivity is] to ensure that the trier
will remain neutral until he renders his decision . . . [and
neutrality is to ensure] the integrity of adversarial deliberations.
(quoting STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION
AND A DEFENSE 34 (1984)) (emphasis added); see also Engler, supra note 1, at
2022-23:
The traditional notions of who should be giving legal advice, and
what it means to be impartial, were developed within the
framework of the adversarial system. The adversarial system
presumes that both sides will be represented by counsel .... The
adversarial system purports to promote fairness and justice. Yet,
the rules currently operate as barriers preventing unrepresented
litigants from participating meaningfully in the legal system and
thereby frustrate the goal of dispensing fairness and justice....
One important barrier is the narrow conception of impartiality
that typically permeates the discussions of the various roles [of
the players in the system, including judges.].
11. Bezdek, supra note 8. It should be noted that although Professor Bezdek's
documentation and analysis focuses on Baltimore's small claims Rent Court, the
structural and systemic features she finds there that silence pro se litigants are
present in most evidentiary hearings and, thus, her conclusions, with some
modification, are applicable to other adjudicatory settings as well. Id. at 533. See
Engler, supra note 1, at 2047-69 (finding similar features in Family and Bankruptcy
courts, and in Boston and New York City housing courts); Jane C. Murphy, Access
to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123, 124-27
(1993) (showing the same is true in Family court); William M. O'Barr & John M.
Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Narratives,
19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 661 (1985) (finding same impediments in informal small
claims courts).
Fall 2007 A Full and Fair Hearing
452 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
understanding this dynamic: the judicial process in most tribunals,
even in relatively informal settings such as small claims courts and
administrative hearings, rejects both the form and substance of the
inevitable manner in which pro se litigants speak, i.e., narrative.
Indeed, it is obvious that narrative is the way in which most people,
except perhaps lawyers and judges, speak and communicate.
In our observations, when invited [to say why they
are in court], . . . many tenants offer the court an
explanation for their nonpayment. The judge either
waits through the story or interrupts it, but at either
point, tells the tenant that her remarks are irrelevant,
and orders judgment for the landlord. This is the clash
between the conventions for talking about troubles in
noninstitutional settings and the law's conventions for
speech within legal institutions, which the judge
learned through formal education in law school and
observation of other legal professionals' courtroom
behavior....
• . . My point is that the judge is structuring the
discourse by leading the tenant into expression and
then dismissing that which the judge elicited. Doing
so in this way is both misleading and destructive.
It is misleading, because the rule-oriented court
talk expected and privileged by judges in low-level
courts bears little or no relation to people's natural
narratives. The rules of courtroom discourse are
seldom explained to those witnesses expected to
conform to them .... Rules of evidence disallow the
ordinary discourse rules used when people talk as they
ordinarily do .... Judges, however, expect parties to
present their own case and abjure "acting as a party's
advocate" by frankly eliciting storylines. . . . As
structured, [the judge's approach] excludes virtually
all tenants from meaningful participation in the
conversation. This makes the legal process a charade.
This is destructive of more than tenant's statutory
rights. For most tenants, such a court offers a stern
lesson that formal rights are for somebody else and
not for them.' 
2
But why is narrative rejected as an appropriate way of speaking
in our judicial system, either in testimony or in oral argument?
Primarily, as Professor Bezdek's analysis demonstrates, because
narrative is viewed as being an uneconomic, rambling mode of
communication, and as an inappropriate means for raising or
demonstrating cognizable legal claims on which legal relief may be
given. Thus, the pro se litigant is continuously interrupted during
that narrative, often by the trier of fact's insisting that much of the
narrative is "irrelevant" to the present case or claim, or not
12. Bezdek, supra note 8, at 586-89 (citing O'Barr & Conley, supra note 11):
In studies of self-represented litigants in small claims courts,
Conley and O'Barr discovered two contrasting modes of
organizing and presenting accounts of the dispute to the judge:
rule-oriented and relation-oriented accounts.... A rule-oriented
account is directed to legal rules. A relational account is oriented
with respect to social rules. The impact of the two story-
presenting modes on small claims judges is significant. The
courts typically treat relational accounts dismissively and regard
their content as irrelevant and inappropriate ....
Professor Bezdek also argues that the court's rejection of the mode of
discourse of the pro se tenant is exacerbated by (or perhaps even rooted in) the
tenant's economic and often race- and gender-based position of subordination vis-
A-vis the economically dominant, represented party and the court as an enforcer of
that party's rights. Id. at 565-75, 583-85; see also Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1990), demonstrating that mere access to formal adjudicatory rituals at
an administrative hearing before an ALI does not comport with due process if it
does not provide a forum in which one can actually speak and be heard:
Familiar cultural images and long-established legal norms
construct the subjectivity and speech of socially subordinated
persons as inherently inferior to the speech and personhood of
dominant groups. Social subordination itself can lead disfavored
groups to deploy verbal strategies that mark their speech as
deviant when measured against dominant stylistic norms. These
conditions . . . undermine the capacity of many persons in our
society to use the procedural rituals that are formally available to
them. Furthermore, bureaucratic institutions disable all citizens -
especially from subordinated social groups-from meaningful
participation in their own political lives (emphasis in original);
Bernard, supra note 5, at 11 (noting potential race-based
determinations in Social Security hearings).
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appropriate.' 3
Indeed, Professor Bezdek's observations and conclusions are
confirmed in my own work with pro se litigants in New York's
Housing Court and in observing ALJs at Social Security disability
hearings, New York City Housing Authority administrative hearings,
and New York City public assistance hearings. I have observed pro
se litigants in Housing Court be reduced to silence or at best
incoherence even after I had given them detailed advice, and in some
instances "pro se papers," with the advice or papers completely
ignored and, thus, rendered ineffective. Even at administrative
hearings where I was representing the claimant and had prepared her
for the hearing, the AL's "direct" and "cross examinations"
frequently had the effect of silencing the claimant, rather than
assisting her in developing the factual record in the only way she
knew how, i.e. in narrative form. This effect was even more apparent
where I have taken cases at the appeal level and reviewed the
administrative hearing transcripts, which document pro se claimants
being continuously interrupted by the AU with leading or even
adversarial questions as they attempt to tell their stories. This
silencing occurs even in the face of the laudable attempts of
individual ALJs to "hear" the pro se narrative and to do "justice" in
the brief time available for each case. Indeed, success in elicitingpro
se narratives, when it occurs, is particularly laudable given the fact
that ALJs receive little or no training, guidelines, administrative
support or peer assistance regarding how to assist pro se litigants by,
among other things, eliciting narrative. 14 The techniques for assisting
13. In its extraordinarily brief subsection dealing with an unrepresented party
at administrative hearings, the Manual for Administrative Law Judges focuses
almost exclusively on the "the simple fact that the unrepresented party may be
difficult to control" or prone to "intemperate outbursts." Manual, supra note 8, at
76. But see White, supra note 12, at 4 ("Social subordination itself can lead
disfavored groups to deploy verbal strategies that mark their speech as deviant
when measured against dominant stylistic norms.").
14. The Manual for Administrative Judges contains no techniques or
guidelines regarding how to elicit facts through narrative, particularly from the pro
se litigant. Manual, supra note 8, at 75. Indeed, the only use of the term
"narrative" in the Manual is where it discusses allowing written narrative testimony
(id. at 53, 170) or written narrative explanation of the content or sources of
information in exhibits. Id. at 53, 226.
pro se litigants in this way do not come naturally and may even be
counterintuitive.
Even those within the system who observe this silencing and
recognize something is amiss often feel powerless to intervene
because of: (1) perceived constraints of role (e.g., "As an ALJ, I
cannot be perceived to be partisan or to be an advocate for one
side."); 15 (2) the crush of the numbers of cases and the resulting
limitations of time, energy and resources; or (3) a sense that the
problems underlying the pro se litigant's inability to articulate her
claim are social, educational or economic and, thus, outside the
system's ability to address.'
6
However, a pro se litigant's constitutional right to be heard and to
have access to justice will ring hollow, indeed, if the administrative
hearing does not function as it was intended to.
The agency adjudication was intended to provide the
public with a user-friendly process that bridged, or
mediated the objective and subjective needs of all
participants. The first generation of adjudicators
attempted to bridge the objective formalities of a civil
trial structure with the lay public's subjective, intuitive
sense of fairness. ALJs aspired to offer the lay public
their last, best hope that justice will be done.
15. In addition to the strictures of role which will be more fully developed
below in Part II, the ALJ may refuse to adjust her usual method for conducting
hearings on the theory that the pro se has chosen to proceed pro se and, thus, is not
entitled to any accommodation. But see Cynthia Gray, Reaching out or
Overreaching: Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants, 27 J. NAALJ 97,
108-09 (2007) ("[T]he inability to obtain affordable legal representation is one of
the primary reasons many pro se litigants appear without a lawyer .... Although
some litigants do choose to appear without an attorney for reasons other than
necessity and economic reality, forbidding latitude for all self-represented litigants
because some have made the 'wrong' choice is unfair to the most vulnerable
individuals in the courtroom. . . . A judge's ethical obligations do not vary
depending on whether the judge believes a litigant has made wise choices.").
16. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 2011-21, 2063-69; see also MEETING
THE CHALLENGE, supra note 1, at 52-62, and Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts
Handling Pro Se Litigants?" 82 JUDICATURE 13, 17-20 (1998) (summarizing
results of surveys of judges regarding the difficulties involved in dealing with pro
se litigants) [hereinafter Handling Pro Se Litigants].
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Laypersons could walk away from the agency with a
sense that neither tricks nor technicalities stood
between themselves and a fair hearing[,] . .[that]
they, nevertheless, had the opportunity "to look their
government in the eye" and say what needed to be
said, and what they had to say would be heard. 17
It cannot be gainsaid that this right to be "heard" before
administrative agencies and in our courts is a fundamental
constitutional right, whether the litigant is represented or not. "Prior
cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum, that
absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the
judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
• .. '[D]ue process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's
defense."" 8 Indeed, "[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored
17. Bernard, supra note 5, at 18 (noting further that in contrast to that original
vision, "In many agencies today, administrative litigation is virtually
indistinguishable from civil litigation . I..." d.); see also Michael Asimow, The
Administrative Judiciary: ALJ's in Historical Perspective, 19 J. NAALJ 25, 33
(1999) (describing ALJs as "the face of justice for the vast array of private citizens
embroiled in administrative disputes with state or federal agencies.").
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971) (emphasis added,
citations omitted), citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A detailed
examination of this constitutional point is beyond the scope of this Article.
Regarding the constitutional right to be heard before administrative agencies, see
Bernard, supra note 5, at 6 n. 11, citing Hon. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PENN. L. REv. 1267 (1975). Regarding the constitutional right to
access to the courts, see Baldacci, supra note 1, at 667-68; MEETING THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 1, at 19-24; for a comprehensive analysis of the problem
of access to justice, especially for persons without lawyers, see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004). On the constitutional, statutory and ethical
duty of adjudicators to assist pro se litigants, see Gray, supra note 15, at 101-107
(describing tension between holding the pro se litigant to the same standard as
attorneys and the need to accommodate their lack of legal training and knowledge
in order to avoid injustice); Handling Pro Se Litigants, supra note 16, at 15-17;
Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-
Represented Litigants, 42 JUDGE'S J. 16, 17-23, 42-45 (2003) (same, noting that
"The law must produce a consistent outcome for all litigants, regardless of their
legal representation, based on the law and facts of their case."). Id. at 44.
to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 19
Accordingly, we must develop methodologies so that pro se
litigants are not merely thrown into adversarial or quasi-adversarial
arenas, but are assisted by the various players in our administrative
systems - most importantly by the ALJs presiding over their cases -
so they can be meaningfully heard, and have a full and fair due
process hearing. To that end, we must develop procedures and
techniques that are tailored to pro se litigants' abilities to tell their
stories in a way that will reveal whether those stories are legally
sufficient to support their claims or defenses.
II. MODELS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
As daunting as the problems faced by pro se litigants may be,
they are not insoluble. Models exist which can at least mitigate the
most serious and constitutionally infirm consequences of appearing
pro se. I do not propose any one of these models as ideal solutions.
Each of them presents problems, both theoretical and practical. Nor
do I suggest that the following is an exhaustive list of all possible
models. However, those included here suggest strategies regarding
how the problem of assisting pro se litigants might be addressed by
ALJs.
A. A More Active Role for AIs Within the Strictures of the
Present System
Studies have consistently shown that some adjudicators are
"better" than others in mitigating the problems faced by pro se
litigants appearing before them.20 A more systematic survey of the
19. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-69 (holding that limiting indigent litigants to
written submissions was constitutionally impermissible since they "lack[ed] the
educational attainment necessary to write effectively."). Id. at 269.
20. Such studies have proven to be invaluable in developing strategies for
meeting the challenge of pro se litigants. See, e.g., MEETING THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 1, at 52-56 (surveying practices of trial judges); see also Handling Pro
Se Litigants, supra note 16, at 17-20 (surveying practices of judges and court
managers) (and other studies cited there); see also Kenneth Nicolai, Strengthening
the Skills of Administrative Law Judges, 20 J. NAALJ 263, at n.1 (2000) (citing
studies of the performance of ALJs).
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successful strategies and interventions used by ALJs would provide
invaluable ideas about addressing those issues. At a minimum, such
a study should look at what assistance ALJs currently provide pro se
litigants at hearings. It should evaluate whether such interventions
are successful or ineffective. Of course, the criteria for determining
"successful" or "ineffective" would have to be carefully articulated.
The primary criterion of "successful," however, must be the extent to
which the intervention assists the pro se litigant in being able to
articulate her claims and defenses, and to understand the nature and
the significance of the proceeding in which she is involved.21
In addition, this survey should make some evaluation regarding
whether such interventions are appropriate to the role of the ALJ as
understood in our current administrative adjudication system, both
adversarial and nonadversarial. If the answer to these questions is in
the affirmative, recommendations for system-wide adoption should
be made. If the answer is in the negative22 and the intervention
21. See Engler, supra note 1, at 2022-31; see also Litigant's Struggle, supra
note 1, at 36-37; Albrecht, supra note 18, at 44 ("The law must produce a
consistent outcome for all litigants, regardless of their legal representation, based
on the law and facts of their case.").
22. Although ethical rules applicable to ALJs attempt to account for the
differences in role and responsibility between ALJs and judges, they generally do
not diverge from the requirement of "impartiality" which is often noted as the basis
for the passive role adopted by judges. For a discussion of the perceived ethical
limitations under the rubric of "impartiality" placed on the role of the judge in
assisting pro se litigants, see Albrecht, supra note 18, at 17-23, 42-43 (surveying
applicable Canons of Judicial Ethics and case law). See also Russell Engler and
Stephen Gillers, Background Memo on Judicial Ethics: The Role of Judges in
Settlement and Trial in Cases Involving Unrepresented Litigants, New York
County Lawyers Association (2006), available at
www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications51 70.pdf, at Appendix A.;
Engler, supra note 1, at 2012-13, 2022-23; Gray, supra note 15, at 104-107; KERRY
HILL, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF THE PRO SE
LITIGANT: AN UPDATE OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES (2002), available at
http://www.ajs.org/prose/prolegalethical.asp; Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at
39-42 (locating origin of limitations on judicial role in assisting pro se litigants in
the history of the common law adversarial system). Regarding similar ethical rules
applicable to ALJs, see Ronnie A. Yoder, Model Code of Judicial Conduct for
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 10 J. NAALJ 131 (1989); Model Code of
Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges, 14 J. NAALJ 279 (1994);
Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAALJ 321
(2002) (describing the implications of ethical rules for defining the role of the
strategy is still deemed to be highly successful, then statutory,
administrative or ethical reforms should be proposed to allow such
modalities of intervention.
Prior to a comprehensive survey of actual practices among ALJs,
the reports and recommendations of courts, organizations, and
scholars suggest some strategies of assistance that should be
implemented by ALJs. Although these reports and recommendations
were generated in the context of civil trials, I would submit that the
techniques and practices they propose are appropriate interventions
for ALJs to use in assisting the pro se litigant in developing the
record in the less formal setting of an administrative hearing. In a
recent article published in this Journal, Cynthia Gray summarizes a
number of protocols adopted by various jurisdictions for assisting pro
se litigants and appends a Proposed Best Practices for Cases
Involving Self-Represented Litigants based on those protocols.23 For
example, a protocol developed by the Pro se Implementation
Committee of the Minnesota Conference of Judges 24 and a similar
draft protocol of the Idaho Committee to Increase Access to the
Courts 25 urge that adjudicators, among other things, explain:
1. The order and protocols of an evidentiary hearing in
detail at the beginning of the hearing;
2. The elements of claims or defenses that each side will
need to demonstrate in order to get the relief they are seeking;
3. That the party bringing the proceeding has the burden
of proof;
4. The consequences of not demonstrating a necessary
ALJ); Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law Judges: Adoption
of a Uniform Code of Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 11 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 7 (2002) (describing various ethical codes and rules applicable to state
ALJs and arguing for a uniform code); Karen S. Lewis, Administrative Law Judges
and the Code of Judicial Conduct: A Need for a Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REv.
929 (1990) (arguing for adoption of an ALJ ethics code and identifying
independence from agency dominance as the primary threat to ALJ impartiality).
23. Gray, supra note 15, at 111-68.
24. Pro Se Implementation Committee of the Minnesota Conference of
Judges, Protocol to be Used by Judicial Officers During Hearings Involving Pro Se
Litigants (2002) [hereinafter Protocol].
25. Idaho Committee to Increase Access to the Courts, Proposed Protocol to
be Used by Idaho Judges During Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants
(2002) [hereinafter Proposed Protocol].
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element or bearing ones burden of proof; and
5. The kind of evidence that may or may not be
presented and considered.
These committees also urge adjudicators to question the pro se
litigant to obtain general information about the litigant's claims or
defenses.26
What is particularly important about these and other similar
protocols is that they provide specific and detailed examples of how
an ALJ can formulate 'explanations and pose questions within the
context of specific case types in ways that the pro se litigant can
understand, retain, and act on.27 Thus, these proposed interventions
are more detailed and situation appropriate than the general type of
stock explanation that many ALJs make at the beginning of a hearing
that merely outlines the structure of the hearing and states in
shorthand form the issue to be resolved.
In its survey of judges, the American Judicature Society has
identified a number of similar strategies that appear to be effective in
assisting pro se litigants; for example:
1. Conducting on-the-record preliminary conferences "to
discuss procedure, deadlines" and "how to do things at trial;, 28
2. Using forms and notices that particularize the issues to
be presented, which party bears the burden, what the standard of
proof will be at the hearing, and the consequences of not appearing or
meeting one's burden; 29
3. Giving "detailed explanations of trial procedures, as
time permits;" and
4. "[A]llowing narrative testimony" and "actively asking
questions and making objections. 3 °
Regarding evidentiary matters, the Society notes that some judges
explain to the pro se litigant:
26. Protocol, supra note 24; Proposed Protocol, supra note 25.
27. Protocol, supra note 24; Proposed Protocol, supra note 25; Gray, supra
note 15, 111-59; Protocols and Best Practices for Housing Court Judges for
Motions and Trials/Hearings Involving Pro Se Litigants, New York County
Lawyers Association (2006), available at
www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications517_0.pdf, at 25-41.
28. MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 1, at 56.
29. Id. at 56-57.
30. Id. at 57.
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1. How to identify evidence relevant to prevailing on or
defeating claims;
2. Procedures for obtaining such evidence;
3. The form that evidence may take;
4. What facts must be demonstrated to make that
evidence admissible (i.e., foundation);
5. The main objections to admissibility (hearsay, best
evidence, etc.);
6. The consequences of not having such evidence;
7. Providing for a reasonable opportunity to obtain such
evidence; and
8. Assisting the pro se litigant at trial in establishing the
necessary foundational elements for admitting such evidence and in
how to testify regarding the substance of such evidence.
31
It is this last form of active judicial intervention which causes the
greatest concerns regarding conduct that is deemed inappropriate to
the impartial role of the trier of fact and which gives rise to fears that
the adjudicator will appear partisan or as an advocate for one side. 32
Although these concerns would appear to be less significant in
administrative hearings (as distinct from the concerns raised in civil
trials, especially in jury trials), it is obvious that an appearance of
partisanship could arise even there. However, as demonstrated
above, 33 given the constitutional dimensions of the problem, it is
necessary to find some form of intervention that can be implemented
without the appearance of partiality. This implementation, of course,
will require heightened awareness by the ALJ of the danger of such
an appearance, and clear indications on the record regarding why
31. Id. at 57-58; see also Handling Pro Se Litigants, supra note 16, at 19-20;
SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 75-84.
32. See supra note 22; see also Allen E. Schoenberger, The Active
Administrative Judge: Is There Harm in an ALJ Asking?, 18 J. NAALJ 399, 404
(1998) (describing examples where ALJ questioning evidenced partiality); Jeffrey
S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative
Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer,
33 Tulsa L.J. 293, 301-307 (1997) (arguing that the active ALJ in a Social Security
hearing becomes deeply involved in the law suit, straining her passivity and
neutrality, and perhaps undermining the due process right to a full and fair hearing
itself).
33. See supra notes 18 and 19, and accompanying text.
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such interventions are being made.
34
Although the American Judicature Society acknowledged such
concerns about an appearance of partiality, it nevertheless adopted as
a policy recommendation that "judges should assure that self-
represented litigants in the courtroom have the opportunity to
meaningfully present their case." 35 The Society also recommended
that "[j]udges should have the authority to insure that procedural and
evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of
self-represented litigants." 36  Indeed, the ABA recently revised its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct by adding a new Comment 4 to
Rule 2.2. That Rule requires that "A judge shall uphold and apply
the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially., 37 Nevertheless, Comment 4 makes clear that "It is not a
violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have
their matters fairly heard., 38
Since the ethical norms applicable to ALJs are modeled on the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the proposals described above
could be implemented within the ethical strictures of the current
system for ALJs and do not require statutory authorization. 39 Thus,
these proposals should be explored and particularized regarding the
appropriate modalities for incorporation into the current structure and
procedures in administrative hearings, both adversarial and
nonadversarial, taking into consideration concerns about the
34. Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When the Parties Appear Pro
Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 423 (2004) (arguing that a judge's neutrality-in fact and in appearance-
can be preserved if she explains on the record the reasons for and modalities of her
assisting a pro se litigant by, among other things, asking questions) [hereinafter
Disconnect].
35. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REVISED PRO SE POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2002) (emphasis added).
36. Id. See also Albrecht, supra note 18, at 45-48 (discussing the general
principles that should guide a judge in assisting the pro se litigant).
37. ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.2 (February 2007).
38. Id., Comment 4. For a more detailed discussion regarding the underlying
rationale for and reasonable accommodations arguably permissible under this
provision, see Gray, supra note 15, at 101-10, 116-27, 130-48.
39. See supra notes 22 and 34.
appearance of partiality.
However, the protocols described above may not be sufficient in
themselves to prevent unjust results in cases involving pro se
litigants. Thus, some commentators have urged reforms that would
significantly enhance the role of the judge well beyond the
parameters suggested by the proposals noted above.40 For example,
it has been proposed that
Judges should freely ask questions of unrepresented
parties and their witnesses. When judges make clear
to the parties at the beginning of the hearing that they
will ask questions-and explain why (to make sure
they have the information they need to make a
decision)-chances are minimal that their apparent
impartiality could be impaired.4'
While such a proposal would not place an affirmative duty on the
AU to develop the factual record unless otherwise required to do so
by law, it would authorize the ALJ to develop the record more
actively than many do at present because of concerns about an
appearance of partiality or simply2 because they are not familiar with
the techniques by which to do so.42 Thus, the ALJ would be required
40. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1 (arguing that such changes should be
adopted even if they require administrative, statutory or constitutional
amendments). But see Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that such
proposals "do not radically alter the adversarial system or the traditional role of the
judge. Nor do they make the judge the feared gatherer of evidence who may
unfairly side with the party whose theory of the case is consistent with his or her
investigation ... ").
41. Albrecht, supra note 18, at 46 (emphasis added); see also Disconnect,
supra note 34. Compare Manual, supra note 8, at 84 (arguing that AU
questioning should be "rare," although allowing that questioning is appropriate to
prevent reversible error, to protect the record against the inclusion of seriously
misleading, obfuscating or confusing testimony, to avoid serious waste of time, to
clarify any confusing or ambiguous testimony, to develop additional facts, or
"when for some other reason assistance is needed to assure orderly development of
the subject matter."). Id.; Bernard, supra note 5, at 11 and 18 (noting that many
ALJs preside over administrative hearings as though they were passive bystanders
so that many hearings are indistinguishable from adversarial trials).
42. See discussion infra Part II.B and C.
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to ask questions to assure that she would have the facts necessary to
do justice in the matter submitted to her for adjudication.43 Similarly,
Professor Goldschmidt proposes that:
The judicial role should be expanded by explicit rules
authorizing judges to provide a reasonable degree of
assistance to pro se litigants in presenting their claim
or defense .... [T]he court should assist by making
sure all evidence the pro se litigant wishes to
introduce is properly offered and admitted (unless
found to be inadmissible due to privilege, irrelevance,
immateriality, or redundancy. . . .). It is common
knowledge that judges often assist attorneys by
suggesting the correct form of a question, a certain
line of inquiry not being pursued, or the manner of
properly offering a document or other item into
evidence. This proposal would, therefore, authorize
similar assistance to pro se litigants. It may seem to
radically change the traditionally passive role of the
adversarial judge, but it is really only a modest
expansion of that role.44
It is clear that the proposals described above would go a long way
in meeting the challenge of the pro se litigant. Under those
proposals, an ALJ would be expected, indeed required, to provide a
reasonable degree of assistance to the pro se litigant in articulating
her claims or defenses. However, since these proposals for reforms
within civil trial courts "do not radically alter the adversarial system
or the traditional role of the judge" in that system, 45 they do not
address the root cause of the problem faced by the pro se litigant, i.e.,
43. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 15, at 139-44; compare Schoenberger, supra
note 32, at 404 ("In general, however, ALJ questioning is permissible, just as is
similar questioning by judges. Problems most frequently arise when questioning
becomes overly extensive or overly aggressive but modest questioning presents no
difficulty.").
44. Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 48 (emphasis added). As noted above,
the ABA has adopted this position. See supra notes 37 and 38, and accompanying
text.
45 Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 45.
being thrust into an adversarial system that presumes representation
by a zealous advocate skilled in the technicalities of evidentiary and
substantive law. I would suggest that this same critique is applicable
even to fora which are less formal and arguably less adversarial and
lawyer-centric than trial courts, including small claims courts and
some administrative hearings, where judges and ALJs frequently fail
to intervene to assist pro se litigants in presenting their claims and
defenses, and in some instances transform the supposed
nonadversarial administrative hearing into an adversarial trial.46
Thus, we must consider more radical, comprehensive and
systemic reforms, even if they significantly change (1) the nature of
our administrative adjudication systems which, although informal in
appearance, are in practice becoming more like adversarial civil trials
and (2) the role of ALJs in those systems which, although offering
the possibility or, indeed, the promise of active assistance, is
nevertheless unduly circumscribed by notions of AU impartiality
and passivity. 47  The next two subsections will discuss such
proposals.
B. ALJs Should Take Full Advantage of the Implications of a
System that is Not Completely Circumscribed by Formal Evidentiary
Rules.
There is general agreement that "[w]hat many describe as the
'technicalities' of the law of evidence present a major barrier to
46. See supra note 5; see also infra note 106. Indeed, the intervention of some
ALJs in supposedly nonadversarial fora not only fails to assist the pro se litigant,
but is itself adversarial, with the AU adopting the world and case view of the
agency, and subjecting the pro se litigant to a series of questions that are not
designed to elicit facts, but are instead focused on exposing supposed weaknesses
in the pro se's case. See Bernard, supra note 5, at 16-17 (demonstrating that the
AL's adopting the agency viewpoint may "leave the decider without a sufficiently
panoramic view of the possibilities." Id. at 17 (citation omitted)); Schoenberger,
supra note 32, at 404-05 (describing ALJ questioning that can be misleading or
confusing, and that inappropriately approximates adversarial cross examination and
attempts to discredit testimony); Wolfe, supra note 32, at 305-06, 333 (describing
the danger of an ALl's questioning becoming an adversarial cross examination that
seeks to destroy the witness' credibility).
47. See, e.g., Bernard, supra note 5, at 9-12, 18; Engler, supra note 1, at 1990-
92, 2011-26, 2028-31.
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making court processes open to all. They not only intimidate the
parties, but also create significant barriers to the presentation of
evidence to the fact finder., 48 Indeed, even many trial judges view
the strict application of the rules of evidence in hearings involving
pro se litigants as impeding a judge's ability to do justice in such
cases.4 9 One court has succinctly summarized the practical impact of
the application of evidentiary rules on the ability of pro se litigants to
present their cases to a judge:
It is simply unrealistic to expect lay litigants to
understand and abide by the formal rules of evidence.
How is a lay plaintiff to be made to understand that
the bill for services which he presents to show the
repair costs for his damaged property must be
authenticated as a business record? Or that the police
report of an accident proves nothing in the eyes of the
law? . . . In the case of inexperienced pro se litigants,
it is better to err on the side of admitting an ore-heap
48. SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 81.
49. See, e.g., Handling Pro Se Litigants, supra note 16, at 18:
Surprisingly, some judges feel the rules of evidence become a
hindrance in certain cases, as do the attorneys themselves.
Several judges suggested a "need to relax the rules so that justice
can be done." Sometimes, "the lawyer whines and complains
that the other side doesn't follow the [evidentiary] rules. That is
true to a point, but the [evidentiary] rule often gets in the way of
the 'truth."' One judge explained, "It's amazing how much
evidence can be presented without attorneys. Much more
effective. Lawyers try to hide evidence much of the time."
See also John Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary
Admissibility in Non-Jury Trials, 86 JUDICATURE 227, 228 (2003) ("When [a pro
se] litigant faces a party represented by counsel in a jury-waived proceeding, rules
of admissibility become more than superfluous: They become weapons that the
lawyer can use to gain an advantage that has nothing to do with the merits of the
case."). Thus, in order to facilitate the admission of clearly relevant and important
facts, judges sometimes relax strict evidentiary requirements, even when the party
is represented by counsel. See, e.g., MEETING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 1, at
57-58; Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 48 ("It is common knowledge that
judges often assist attorneys by suggesting the correct form of a question, a certain
line of inquiry not being pursued, or the manner of properly offering a document or
other item into evidence.").
of evidence in the belief that nuggets of truth may be
found amidst the dross, rather than to confine the
parties to presenting assayed and refined matter which
qualifies as pure gold under the rules of evidence.
50
As demonstrated above in Part I, the primary reason why
evidentiary rules frustrate and, indeed, silence pro se litigants in
presenting their claims and defenses is our adversarial common law
system's rejection of narrative as an appropriate modality for the
introduction of evidence. 5 1 As we also saw above in Part I, the mere
imparting of legal information to a pro se litigant, including
regarding the rules of evidence, is generally insufficient to overcome
the silencing effect of the imposition of the strictures of our formal
adversarial system, including evidentiary rules, which presumes
representation by a trained zealous advocate. 2
This same debate regarding the problems of imposing evidentiary
rules on pro se litigants at administrative hearings has been given
voice in this and other journals. Even though most administrative
hearings are to some degree freed from the strictures of formal
50. Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 859-60 (Ct. App. 4th
1993).
51. See also O'Barr & Conley, supra note 11, at 666-67:
Our analysis of our earlier data repeatedly confirmed the intuition
that lay witnesses come to formal courts with a repertoire of
narrative customs and strategies that are often frustrated, directly
or indirectly, by the operation of the law of evidence .... These
restrictions and prohibitions are supported by the statutory or
common law of evidence or by unwritten custom widely
followed in formal courts. Yet reflection on how we ordinarily
speak suggests that each [evidentiarily] forbidden practice is
common, if not essential, in everyday narration (emphasis
added).
52. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also O'Barr & Conley, supra
note 11, at 672:
Witnesses' reactions to [evidentiary] objection sequences suggest
that they have little understanding of the nature of this conflict
[between the epistemological assumptions of the law of evidence
and those of ordinary narrative speech] and that the explanations
offered by the courts do little to enlighten them about why the law
deems their narratives unacceptable. (emphasis added).
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evidentiary rules, 53 the allure of the rules of evidence to ALJs trained
in our adversary system is tempting even in the context of
administrative hearings. 54 Obviously, where evidentiary rules are not
imposed by law, ALJs should assure that their hearing practices do
not have the unintended result of importing such evidentiary
obstacles.
Where the rules of evidence are imposed on ALJs to some degree
by law, the recommendations of a number of commentators that
evidentiary rules be relaxed, or indeed, be jettisoned completely in
cases involving pro se litigants, using the model of Small Claims
courts and non-adversarial administrative hearings as a guide for
such a reform,55 should be adopted. However, to the extent that rules
of evidence remain operative in some hearings, their impact on pro
53. See Manual, supra note 8, at 85-90 (describing general concept "that strict
common law rules of evidence do not apply, by their own force, to administrative
proceedings," id at 85, but noting that some agencies and jurisdictions require the
following of rules of evidence "so far as practicable." Id. at 86; see more generally
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency
Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1987).
54. See, e.g., Christine McKenna Moore, Evidence for Administrative Law
Judges, 15 J. NAALJ 201 (1995) (arguing that the rules of evidence should be
imposed at all administrative hearings, although granting that "I am perfectly
content with the notion that the formal rules can and should be adapted, to the
particular caseload of an agency and within the context of a particular case.") Id. at
207. Indeed, one of Moore's reasons for her proposal to impose formal evidentiary
rules is that ALJs are lawyers "who have actually tried cases in the real world and
know litigation, rather than agency attorneys and program people." Id. at 201. See
also Manual, supra note 8, at 87-88 (arguing that although evidentiary rules are not
applicable in administrative hearings unless imposed by statute or agency rule, "It
is worthwhile, however for the ALI to be familiar with these rules. They can
furnish guidance and insights which can help resolve evidentiary problems." Id. at
88). Apparently following that admonition, it has been noted that "In many
agencies today, administrative litigation is virtually indistinguishable from civil
litigation .... Bernard, supra note 5, at 18. But see Pierce, supra note 53, at 25-
26 ("Agencies also should refrain from imposing on ALJs the straightjacket of the
FRE. Instead, agencies should provide as much guidance as possible, including
adoption of the weighted balancing test of FRE 403, to enable ALJs to perform
their important case management function."); Bernard, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing
that ALJs should follow evidentiary principles without imposing complex
evidentiary rules).
55. See Engler, supra note 1, at 2028; see also Litigant's Struggle, supra note
1, at 51-53; SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 81-83.
se litigants can be mitigated. In order to avoid either interrupting the
pro se litigant's narrative or the apparent anomaly of the represented
party's attorney objecting to the ALJs own questions, one proposal
urges the ALJ to insist on conducting the hearing in a more informal
manner, particularly regarding the application of the rules of
evidence. Indeed, ALJs within systems that impose evidentiary
rules have even greater discretion than trial judges to overrule
evidentiary objections given that most systems provide escape
clauses regarding the imposition of evidentiary rules, such as
imposing them only in "so far as practicable," or imposing the rules
only as guidelines, or providing that the rules may be relaxed in order
to avoid injustice.57  It has also been recommended that the
adjudicator require the attorney to include in his objection sufficient
understandable information so the pro se litigant can cure the defect
and that the judge refuse to uphold objections merely on the grounds
of the form of a question or testimony.
58
One might also consider a modified application of Small Claims
courts procedures. For example, one could relax the rules of
evidence only where the unrepresented party bears the burden of
proof, or only where both sides are unrepresented, or where the
represented party consents to the relaxation.59 One might also
consider whether evidentiary rules should be relaxed only for the pro
se litigant or also for the represented party. However, such shifting
rules would appear to place an unnecessary burden on an ALJ to
determine which rules should apply in the matter before the ALJ and
could lead to confusing and inconsistent or indeed arbitrary
application. Thus, I would propose that a uniform approach be
adopted in all cases where at least one party is pro se in which the
56. Albrecht, supra note 18, at 47-48.
57. Manual, supra note 8, at 85-86; see also Albrecht, supra note 18, at 47
(recommending that the judge "convince the attorney of the benefits of proceeding
informally," by, among other things, overruling an evidentiary objection "on the
grounds that it would be a waste of judicial resources to proceed in formal
compliance with the rules of evidence.").
58. Id., at 47-48; see also SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 81-84.
59. Some commentators have suggested strategies by which a court might
"convince the attorney of the benefits of proceeding informally." Albrecht, supra
note 18, at 47 (emphasis added); see also SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 81-
83.
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same evidentiary rules apply to both parties, whether they are
represented or not.60 However, within such a uniform system, one
could jettison either in whole or in part only those evidentiary rules
which might have a greater likelihood of excluding otherwise reliable
evidence, e.g., hearsay or documentary foundations.6'
Because administrative hearings are judge trials rather than jury
trials, the AL's ability to disregard facts that might be inadmissible
in hearings where evidentiary rules are applied ameliorates concerns
about the adjudicator's having such facts before her.62 The primary
60. See Albrecht, supra note 18, at 18 (recommending that the same protocols
be applied whether the other party is represented or not).
61. See Sheldon, supra note 49, at 231; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
1, § 327 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). Indeed, the ALJ has even greater
discretion than trial judges to limit the application of evidentiary rules. See supra
note 57. In any event, even in administrative hearings where the rules of evidence
apply, the issue of exclusion generally does not arise unless the represented party
raises an evidentiary objection. See SELF-HELP COURT, supra note 1, at 81 ("In
theory then, in most jurisdictions, in the absence of objection, most evidence comes
in and may be given what weight the fact finder finds appropriate."), citing
MCCORMICK, supra, § 52 ("The general approach, accordingly, is that a failure to
object to an offer of evidence at the time the offer is made, assigning the grounds,
is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of complaint against its admission.").
62. Sheldon, supra note 49, at 228:
When judges sit without juries, however, there is no point either
in trying to screen evidence or in issuing limiting instructions.
Screening is impossible, because the person who does the
screening is the very person from whom the evidence is supposed
to be screened, and it makes no sense to ask judges to instruct
themselves.
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 61, § 60 ("[J]udges possess professional
experience in valuing evidence greatly lessening the need for exclusionary rules.").
But see Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (2005)
(arguing that "judges are generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but
inadmissible information of which they are aware."). Nevertheless, even though a
trial judge is required to strictly apply the rules of evidence under our current
system,
[appellate] courts have said that in reviewing a case tried without
a jury the admission of inadmissible evidence [even] over
objection will not ordinarily be a ground for reversal if there was
admissible evidence sufficient to support the findings. The judge
will be presumed to have disregarded the inadmissible and relied
on the admissible evidence.
27-2
focus of the system would be to allow the pro se litigant's narrative
to unfold with minimal interruptions or objections. Perhaps
objections, to the extent that the AU permits them, could be reserved
or raised in short hand form or be agreed to prior to the hearing.
Accordingly, the goals of this approach would be to avoid
interrupting the narrative with objections and to find other ways of
preserving technical evidentiary objections on the record to the extent
that they are required by law in particular administrative fora.
63
In any event, the relaxing of the rules of evidence and procedure,
which appear to be two significant determinants in silencing pro se
litigants, will go a long way to address the problems identified above
in Part I of this paper. However, adopting a model free from the
rules of evidefce is not a guarantee that pro se litigants will be able
to fully and adequately articulate their narrative before the AU. As
noted above, Professor Bezdek observed systemic silencing of pro se
litigants in Baltimore's Rent Court, which is based on the Small
Claims model with relaxed rules of evidence. 64 In addition, similar
Id.; see also RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 1-
103 (1995). Of course, a finding of plain error, where the substantial rights of a
party are affected by admitting inadmissible evidence, can result in reversal.
MCCORMICK, supra note 61, § 52. For a summary of the arguments for abolishing
the rules of evidence in all non-jury trials, whether or not they involve pro se
litigants, see Sheldon, supra note 49 (noting that in other common law countries
"the common law of admissibility of evidence.., has little practical impact in civil
trials before judges. In England, the admissibility of most forms of evidence in
civil cases is left to the trial justice's sound discretion.") Id. at 229; see also
FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM
157-58 (1994) (proposing the elimination of exclusionary rules, particularly the
hearsay rule, even in jury trials); but see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Shedding Some
Light on Calls for Hearsay Reform: Civil Law Hearsay Rules in Historical and
Modern Perspective, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 93 (2001) (arguing that evidentiary
rules are essential to our common law adversarial system); Moore, supra note 54,
at 201 (same "whether the dispute takes place in a court of general jurisdiction or
an administrative tribunal, before a jury or a judge.").
63. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Litigant's
Struggle, supra note 1, at 48.
64. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text; see also Bezdek, supra note
8, at 588 ("In small claims courts, where many such evidentiary constraints are
relatively relaxed, we might expect there to be more tolerance for ordinary speech,"
finding that such is not the case); O'Barr & Conley, supra note 11 (documenting
the factors in Small Claims courts which limit the legal adequacy of pro se
narratives); Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 42 (and works cited therein).
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limitations have been documented even in nonadversarial
administrative hearings not encumbered by the rules of evidence.65
The silencing and distorting effect of the rules of evidence, even
when not applicable to the administrative hearing, is starkly
described in Professor White's retelling of Mrs. G's welfare hearing:
At the fair hearing, it was Mrs. G's voice, rather than
her behavior, which was compelled to assent to the
bureaucratized - and arguably also gendered - logic of
welfare. The law of evidence - doctrines of relevancy
and materiality - commanded her to keep her speech
within the categories that the legislative/administrative
process had generated. Even though the technicalities
of evidence law did not apply to her case, the hearing
officer would only attend to the narrow issues that the
AFDC regulations charged him to decide.
Discrete responses to those questions - that was the
measure of "participation" that the hearing gave Mrs.
G. She best not "fight the questions" if she wanted
her voice to be heard at all. Rather, she had to speak
her need as an accounting of how she had spent a few
hundred dollars. Within these constraints, her speech
might be worth that sum if she won; it would have no
other consequence. 66
Thus, the mere relaxing or inapplicability of evidentiary rules in
administrative hearings does not in and of itself assure that the pro se
litigant's narrative will be elicited and heard in any constitutionally
meaningful sense.67 Rather, the AU must also take full advantage of
65. See supra note 5; see infra note 106.
66. White, supra note 12, at 43-4 (emphasis in original).
67. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 1, at 2044 ("rule changes alone are unlikely to
eliminate problems facing the unrepresented poor . . . ") (citing Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 245, 268 (1985)); see also John M. Conley & William M.
O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision
Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REv. 467, 506 (1988):
Informal justice is also a process created to protect individual
rights. Small claims courts were conceived in part to enable
her freedom from the constraints of evidentiary rules by addressing
two additional factors which contribute to the pro se litigant's
silencing even without the strictures of formal evidentiary rules of
exclusion.
68
First, an ALJ should not be seduced into believing that the mere
relaxing or inapplicability of evidentiary rules, in and of itself,
remedies the power imbalance between a pro se and a represented
party or a governmental agency. As noted above, the economic and
often racial and gender status of the pro se party places her in a
position of subordination within the legal system, and profoundly
affects her ability to speak or to have her voice heard in any
meaningful or persuasive way by the ALJ. 69 This power imbalance is
further exacerbated by the advantage resulting from the usual case of
the dominant party's being represented by a zealous advocate, skilled
in both substantive and procedural law, and familiar with the culture
and practices of the administrative forum in which he or she practices
on a regular basis. 70 This power imbalance is evident even where the
governmental agency is not represented, since the pro se is battling a
negative decision by what she may perceive to be an all-powerful
consumers, tenants, and others with limited power to assert rights
inexpensively and expeditiously. As our data demonstrate,
however, there is no such thing as the process of informal justice.
It is, rather, a broad range of different processes, with the
differences deriving in significant part from the role perceptions
of those [i.e., judges] who administer it.... We can only reiterate
our concern about the discrepancy between the ideal of a system
of informal justice designed to help certain types of litigants and
the reality of many systems, each of which meets some needs but
may ignore others. We are troubled that this variation is
effectively concealed from litigants and beyond their control.
(emphasis added).
68. The concerns and techniques set forth below are also applicable even
under the more modest proposals described above in Part II.A.
69. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
70. See Engler, supra note 1, at 2068-69; see also Gray, supra note 15, at 117-
18 (describing appearance of bias arising from judge's apparent familiarity with
attorney for represented party); Bernard, supra note 5, at 16-18 (observing the
danger of the "degree and quality of interaction" between the ALJ and agency
staff).
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government agent.71 "Worse yet, the AU may have wholly adopted
the agency's world view without realizing it has happened. The
process of inculcation may occur primarily through the informal
daily interactions whereby the AU hears mostly only one side of a
controversy: namely, the agency's."72 Accordingly, the AU must
consistently and systematically "[r]emain alert to imbalances of
power."
73
Techniques for addressing this imbalance have been suggested by
commentators. For example, an AU needs to be sure to inquire
about the pro se litigant's views on the issues before her at each stage
of the proceeding.74 The AU should also resist the temptation of
allowing the attorney or the governmental representative, who may
be more facile in using the terminology and categories familiar to the
AU, to define the factual and legal issues before her.75  This is
71. Bernard, supra note 5, at 18 (describing an administrative hearing as a
place where a party "look[s] their government in the eye," no doubt a daunting
experience for an unrepresented party); White, supra note 12, at 35-37 (describing
the silencing effect of a claimant's fear of retaliation by the welfare office if she
challenges its determination by seeking legal assistance or asking for a hearing).
72. Bernard, supra note 5, at 17; see also Lewis, supra note 22, at 956-57
(describing ALJ's relationship to the governmental agency and the ALJ's resulting
susceptibility to undue influence as a primary threat to ALJ impartiality).
73. Albrecht, supra note 18, at 47; see also supra note 72; Beatrice A.
Moulton, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as
Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657 (1969)
(describing effects of power imbalance in spite of the Small Claims judge's
statutory power to conduct an informal hearing, raise objections or defenses for a
party, conduct independent investigation of facts, disregard technical rules of
evidence, and exercise equitable powers).
74. Albrecht, supra note 18, at 47; see also Disconnect, supra note 34, at 439
("Judicial inquiry of the parties as to whether they understand what is expected of
them, what the judge is doing, what has been decided, and the consequences of that
decision. .. serve[ ] justice by making it possible to obtain more information when
misunderstanding has led to lack of information, and serve[ ] the appearance of
justice by showing the interest of the judge injustice.").
75. Bezdek, supra note 8, at 569-70 (describing how even unrepresented
landlords are often allowed to establish the terms of the court's inquiry of the pro
se litigant); Bernard, supra note 5, at 17 (describing how this dynamic can occur
even prior to the hearing by the ALJ's adopting the agency's world or case view).
The issue here is not essentially one of chronology, i.e., who speaks first. Rather,
the primary issue is one of dominance by the represented party or the governmental
agency, and the ALJ's deference to or reliance on that party's presentation of the
27-2
particularly important where the pro se litigant bears the burdens of
proof or persuasion. Accordingly, by employing techniques which
signal to the pro se litigant that her view of the facts or the law is not
being discounted simply because of her economic, racial, gender, or
pro se status, but indeed is welcome and valued, the ALJ will in
some measure mitigate the silencing effects of such status-based
subordination.
Second, an ALJ must construct appropriate modalities of
intervention to assist the pro se litigant in telling her story or
narrative.76 However, if the ALJ merely invites the pro se litigant to
"tell your story" or "explain why you think the agency's decision is
issues as the sole lens through which the evidentiary hearing is seen.
Invariably, the judge starts the hearing with the landlord's claim.
• . So the tenant starts her comments with [that claim]. Most
often, only [the landlord's claim] has been spoken of when the
judge dismisses the tenant's speech and rules for the landlord.
As structured, it excludes virtually all tenants from meaningful
participation in the conversation. This makes the legal process a
charade.
Bezdek, supra note 8, at 589.
76. The notion that narrative testimony is prohibited in trial courts and, by
extension, should be prohibited in administrative hearings, is overstated. FRE
section 611 (a) provides that, "The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth,
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment
or undue embarrassment." (emphasis added). This discretionary power includes
'let[ting] a witness testify in narrative form." CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE §. 293 (2d ed. 1994), citing N.
Pac.R.R. Co. v. Charless, 51 F. 562 (9th Cir. 1892) (affirming the trial court's
ruling that narrative was "the best way of getting at what [the plaintiff] knew or
could state." 51 F. at 570, revd on other grounds, 162 U.S. 359 (1896). See also
Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762-63 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Ritualistic
formality in presenting evidence should not deter untrained witnesses from telling
their story in their own words. We hold here, it is only when evidence which is
traditionally considered untrustworthy or unreliable, assumes the stature of undue
significance that we must recognize error."); People v. Dickman, 253 N.E.2d 546,
547-48 (I11. App. Ct. 1969) ("The trial court has the discretion to allow the
narrative form of testimony, particularly if it is best suited to the characteristics of
the particular witness."). Compare State v. Joyner, 848 P.2d 769 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to disallow
narrative testimony where defendant signaled his intent to refer to excluded
evidence during his proposed narrative testimony).
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wrong" or "tell me why you think you are disabled," the resulting
narrative, free from evidentiary constraints but unassisted by AU
intervention, will generally be factually incomplete and probably
legally insufficient.77  Thus, intervention by the AU is essential.
O'Barr and Conley have catalogued some of the indicia in unassisted
pro se narratives which signal the pro se's quandary regarding the
sufficiency of her story and her need for such intervention.78 For
example, pro se litigants will frequently ask where to begin or end
the narrative, or otherwise indicate that they do not know the
"relevant" time periods. They will also continue the narrative, with
segments linked with "ands" or pauses until they think they've told
"enough." They frequently use "rising intonation" at the end of
segments, which signals a request for "acknowledgment and
understanding."
79
Without assistance from the ALJ, the pro se litigant will simply
continue her narrative until she thinks what she has said is sufficient
to defeat the agency's position or support her request for relief.8
0
However, she will generally not have structured the narrative in a
deductive manner, based on a theory of the case, which directly
refutes the government's or other adversary's position in a manner
that is cognizable under the applicable law or which supports her
claim.81 Accordingly, unassisted, the pro se litigant's narrative will
77. O'Barr & Conley, supra note 11, at 676-77 (describing how pro se
litigants in small claims courts "invariably responded [to such invitations] not by
answering the questions in a narrow sense but by commencing a chronological
narrative of the dispute as they perceived it. The scope of these narratives often
went far beyond the facts that the court was empowered to adjudicate." Id. at 677);
see also id. at 662 ("unassisted lay witnesses seldom impart to their narratives the
deductive, hypothesis-testing structure with which judges are most familiar and
often fail to assess responsibility for events in question the way that the law
requires.") (emphasis added); Bezdek, supra note 8, at 588 (describing how by
asking the pro se litigant "Is there anything you want to tell me?," the judge "is
structuring the discourse by leading the tenant into expression and then dismissing
that which the judge elicited. Doing so in this way is both misleading and
destructive.").
78. O'Barr & Conley, supra note 11, at 681-83.
79. Id. at 683.
80. Id. at 685 ("When [the pro se litigant] concludes, he apparently believes
that he has given the court an adequate basis for finding against [the other party].").
81. Id. at 685-86 ("It may be significant that in his narrative, the [pro se
litigant] proceeded as if the facts would speak for themselves .... He does not lay
generally be seen to be legally inadequate, 82 in spite of the fact that it
will often contain all of the elements which, if marshaled by a
lawyer, would be legally adequate.
83
Thus, the ALJ must assist the pro se litigant in structuring and
developing her narrative so that its legal adequacy can be articulated
and evaluated. O'Barr and Conley have documented the efficacy of
judicial interventions in informal Small Claims courts which guide
the pro se litigant in: (1) identifying narrative beginning and end
points; 84 (2) emphasizing facts which are more probative than others
regarding the primary legal issues before the ALJ; (3) specifying the
harm suffered or the relief sought; (4) identifying corroborative facts;
(5) constructing facts according to the legal elements required for
relief; and (6) responding to the government's or other adversary's
factual and legal claims or defenses. 85 Accordingly, even in a system
freed from the strictures of evidentiary rules, the role of the ALJ must
be expanded to include "facilitating the unrepresented litigant's
presentation of his or her own case-as the litigant has conceived it..
out a theory of the case for testing. Rather, he presents the facts he considers
relevant and expects them to lead to a conclusion.").
82. Id. at 684 ("The most significant problems faced by small claims litigants
relates to the legal adequacy of their narratives.... Legally inadequate narratives
are for our purposes narratives that differ substantially in form and content from the
accounts judges are accustomed to dealing with by training and experience.").
83. Id. at 678:
The narrator provides three types of evidence within his account.
First, he produces documents that support his story. Second, he
calls 'witnesses' by performing their parts. Third, he introduces
physical evidence .... In an everyday account, some of these
might not have been included. Their inclusion in the [pro se's]
testimony hints at his conception of legal adequacy ...
Analyzed in this manner, relatively unconstrained narratives
offered as evidence to the court reveal lay models of the kinds of
accounts that are appropriate and sufficient to prove a [claim or
defense]. (emphasis in original).
Id.
84. Id. at 683.
85. Id. at 693-94 (describing a pro se litigant who "had the benefit of a referee
who was willing and able to develop a theory of [the case], frame the case in
deductive terms, and then test the hypothesis developed against the evidence."); see
id. at 696 (describing magistrates who "intervene sometimes to restructure
testimony for the apparent benefit of the witness and sometimes to resolve an issue
that the witness seems determined to avoid.").
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,,86
The techniques by which an ALJ can obtain information from a
witness in a non-leading, "non-suggestive" manner are well-
documented in the literature on client and witness interviewing. 87
One commentator describes how the person asking questions can
assist the witness in reinstating the context in which the events took
place and by urging the witness to tell all of the facts, not those
which she believes to be "relevant," and by assisting the witness in
remembering events in different orders and from different
perspectives. 8 He further describes the stages of such an interview,
i.e., first inviting an open-ended narration; then probing for details by
directing the witness's attention back to each significant topic,
beginning with open-ended questions, followed-up with narrower
questions for each topic; and then reviewing with the witness all of
what is judged to be relevant information culled during the prior
stages. 89
This expansion of the active role of the ALJ is perhaps a judge's
most daunting challenge in dealing with pro se litigants. First, little
or no training is currently in place for ALJs regarding these
interventions and techniques. Thus, it is not surprising that the
86. Albrecht, supra note 18, at 44 (noting that such assistance does not
transform the judge into an advocate, but simply a facilitator); Litigant's Struggle,
supra note 1, at 48-51 (describing the court's role in facilitating admission of
evidence and "bringing out facts"); Hon. Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts
Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive Law, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6, 10
(1998) ("Judges and arbitrators [in small claims courts] have nearly unfettered
discretion, subject to-due process concerns, in 'taking active charge of the
proceedings and examining witnesses."') (citation omitted).
87. See, e.g., Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 41-52 (1995) (describing the "simple" techniques of
"cognitive interviewing" which help the witness remember and narrate the full
facts of her narrative); see also Disconnect, supra note 34, at 443-45 (describing
techniques for assisting a pro se litigant during direct examination and in making
out a primafacie case).
88. Wydick, supra note 87, at 45-48.
89. Id. at 48-50; see also DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE
& PAUL R. TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH 167-180(2004) (describing the "T-Funnel" question pattern of first
using open-ended non-leading questions to maximize information gathering before
resorting to closed questions to fill in gaps or to get more specific information).
modality of asking questions used by some ALJs, schooled as they
are in the adversary system, often consists of narrow, leading types of
questions that elicit only limited information and may become
adversarial cross examination in form and intent.90 The use of less
leading questions such as "who," "what," where," "why," "when"
and "how" may add incrementally to the facts before the ALJ, but
they do not provide the type of probing and directed questioning
which research has shown to be necessary to elicit the full story from
pro se litigants. 9' Accordingly, judicial training and continuing legal
education must include exposure to and an opportunity to practice
more appropriate and productive techniques of questioning pro se
litigants and of otherwise assisting them in telling their stories.
Second, this expansion of the active role of the ALJ may also
challenge the AL's deeply-held notion of the appropriate judicial
role as being one of a relatively passive trier of facts even when the
ALJ is under a duty to actively develop the record.92 It also requires
an ALJ to acknowledge that her notion of her role significantly
affects and, to some degree, determines the extent and nature of the
interventions she is prepared to make to assist a pro se litigant. There
is no question that most ALJs have some general notion of what they
believe to be role-appropriate interventions based on their
understanding of current legal and ethical norms, 93 as well as their
own practices.94 However, in an empirical study of more than eighty
Small Claims cases in Colorado and North Carolina, Conley and
O'Barr have documented five distinctive judicial role-types and their
90. See supra note 46.
91. See supra notes 77 - 85 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 10, 16, 22, 23; see also Bernard, supra note 5, at 11
(describing some Social Security ALJs as having adopted a passive role more
usually associated with trial judges); STRIER, supra note 62, at 84, ("[T]he Anglo-
American judge's image and functions as those of a mere moderator of a contest..
. have left this seemingly powerful figure (and with him the parties) at the mercy of
the professional combatants.") (quoting ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 265 (1971)).
93. See supra note 22.
94. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text; see also Manual, supra
note 8, at 74-76, 84; Wolfe, supra note 32, at 346-47 (noting the dissonance
experienced by "the [administrative law] judge, trained and experienced in the
adversarial system of justice" and the active role required of many ALJs.).
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significant impact on each type's hearing practices and decisions:
95
Judges applying the same substantive and procedural
law-and sometimes sitting in adjacent courtrooms-
dispense justice in radically different ways .... Our
examination of what judges say in rendering on-the-
spot judgments suggests that this behavioral variation
derives from divergent conceptions of the judge's role
and the nature of legal decision-making. Thus, the
law interpreter (Judge A), who rarely deviates from
the straightforward application of legal rules, speaks
of a process in which she is at the mercy of unyielding
principles, even when she is disturbed by the results
they produce. The law maker (Judge B), who adapts
or even invents rules of law in pursuit of justice as she
sees it, expresses herself in terms which suggest that
the law is there to serve her ends, and not vice versa.
The mediator (Judge C), who treats the adjudicative
process as simply an opportunity to work out a
compromise, puts similar emphasis on her central and
highly discretionary role in the system. The
authoritarian (Judge D), who renders definitive legal
judgments and often involves himself in the personal
affairs of the litigants, speaks in extraordinarily
personal terms in exercising his authority. Finally, the
proceduralist (Judge E), defined by his close,
sometimes obsessive attention to procedural details,
paints a verbal picture of a legal decision maker who
is armed with discretionary power, yet protected from
direct interaction with the litigants by several layers of
legal formality. In each instance, there is a clear
parallel between the judge's attitude as revealed in his
unrehearsed speech and the individual's behavior on
95. Conley & O'Barr, supra note 66, at 481-504 (describing conclusions of
their study of more than eighty small claims proceedings, which included
observation of each proceeding, review of transcripts, and conversations with the
judges involved).
the bench.96
Accordingly, ALJs must reflect on whether their concept of
judicial role-type, perhaps using the above typology as a guide, limits
their ability to implement the interventions proposed in this section as
necessary to assure pro se litigants' equal access to justice.97 As has
been argued throughout this paper and by other commentators, an
AL's individual concept of role must give way to assuring equal
access to justice for the pro se litigant.9 8  This admonition is
particularly apt where an AU inappropriately imports notions of
judicial passivity from our adversarial, formal civil justice system.
Absent such a refocusing and reformulating of the role of the ALJ,
"the effectiveness of changes such as [those proposed in this section],
96. Id. at 504.
97. There are, of course, considerations other than that of "role" that may
deter an AU from assisting a pro se litigant. Related to considerations of "role" is
the ALJ's concern about an appearance of partiality described supra note 22. See
also Engler, supra note 1, at 2011-21; Schoenberger, supra note 31, 404-406; see
also Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 48-49 (noting that "assistance [to pro se
litigants] is only perceived as unfair by the represented litigant who already has an
unfair advantage over the pro se litigant."); Disconnect, supra note 34, at 437.
If what happens [during trial] is analyzed only in moment to
moment terms it may seem non-neutral, when, for example, a
judge asks a question of one party. But if that question is
established as part of a process in which all [witnesses] are asked
questions when needed for the judge to understand what
happened, then a process that is seen to be neutral in an overall
sense has been created ... even if it may help more those who
need to be helped because they lack counsel or education or both.
(emphasis added).
Id.
98. Engler, supra note 1, at 2022-23.
The adversarial system purports to promote fairness and justice.
Yet, the rules currently operate as barriers preventing
unrepresented litigants from participating meaningfully in the
legal system and thereby frustrate the goal of dispensing fairness
and justice. Given a choice between clinging to the rules at the
expense of the goal, or modifying the rules to further the goal, the
rule must be modified (emphasis added).
Id. Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 51 ("Both rules of court and judicial
ethics must be modified accordingly to free judges to engage in these activities
[i.e., asking questions, calling witnesses, and conducting limited independent
investigations] and determine the 'truth' in every case.").
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will be limited, if not undercut. ..'." 99
C. Adopting an Inquisitorial Model in Which the ALJ Bears an
Affirmative Duty to Develop the Factual Record and Identify
Controlling Law
Both of the proposals described above in Parts A and B envision
an enhanced role for an ALJ in assisting the pro se litigant in
articulating her theory of the case and in introducing evidence in
support of that theory.100 However, my concern in this section is
whether those proposals are sufficient to assure pro se litigants a full
and fair hearing and, thus, equal access to justice. Unfortunately, I
submit that the answer to that question must be in the negative. The
studies and commentaries referred to above suggest that even with
enhanced judicial assistance, the fundamental power imbalance
between represented and unrepresented parties or between an
unrepresented party and a governmental agency, coupled with the
disempowering effect of the pro se litigant's lack of familiarity and
facility with legal categories, even in nonadversarial hearings, will
not be redressed solely by those measures. Accordingly, some
commentators have proposed that triers of fact should be given an
affirmative duty to develop the factual record and to identify and
apply controlling law, following the model of ALJs in some
nonadversarial administrative hearings, such as Social Security
disability hearings, and in the inquisitorial model used in some
jurisdictions. 101
99. Engler, supra note 1, at 2069.
100. It has been suggested that such an expansion of role is appropriate even
for trial judges operating within the strictures of our adversarial system. Litigant's
Struggle, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that such proposals "do not radically alter the
adversarial system or the traditional role of the judge. Nor do they make the judge
the feared gatherer of evidence who may unfairly side with the party whose theory
of the case is consistent with his or her investigation . . . ."). However, even
Goldschmidt acknowledges that some of his proposals may require some statutory
or administrative reforms. See id. at 51.
101. See Engler, supra note 1, at 2017-18, 2028-31; Litigant's Struggle, supra
note 1, at 51; Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice:
Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role
of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 969,975-80 (2004); Joan L. Dwyer, Fair
Play the Inquisitorial Way: A Review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's Use
An AU in some federal, state, and municipal administrative fora
already "has an affirmative duty to assist a pro se claimant in
developing his case.' 10 2  This duty to assist requires that the AU
"probe into . . . and explore for all the relevant facts."10 3
Consideration should be given to the implications of imposing this
same duty on ALJs in all administrative hearings involving pro se
litigants. Such an imposition would directly address pro se litigants'
inability to develop factual records and to present the facts in a way
that demonstrates the legal sufficiency of their cases.'°4
However, merely imposing this duty on an ALJ by a rule change
is no guarantee that the pro se litigant will receive the assistance she
is promised by such a rule change. 1°5 ALJs who are currently bound
by this duty frequently fail to fulfill their obligation to develop the
of Inquisitorial Procedures, 22 J. NAALJ 81 (2002); see also STRIER, supra note
62, at 283-84 (proposing incorporating aspects of the inquisitorial model even
where both parties are represented and even in jury trials). But see Wolfe, supra
note 32, at 345-47 (arguing that a Social Security ALJ should be "return[ed] to her
jurisprudentially passive role" in order to avoid what is seen as the jurisprudential
errors arising from the combination of an inquisitorial AU and a single party
system.) Id. at 347.
102. See, e.g., Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he rule
in our circuit [is] that 'the ALJ, unlike a judge in a trial, must [her]self
affirmatively develop the record' in light of 'the essentially non-adversarial nature
of a benefits proceeding . . . .' [E]ven when, as here, claimant is represented by
counsel.") (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1996)) (quoting
Echevarria v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 685 F.2d 751, 755 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Manual, supra note 8, at 6-8 (describing AL's duty to develop an accurate
and complete record).
103. Echeverria, 685 F.2d at 755:
Where, as here, the claimant is unrepresented by counsel, the
ALJ is under a heightened duty to scrupulously and
conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the
relevant facts. A reviewing court must determine whether the
AU adequately protect[ed] the rights of [a] pro se litigant by
ensuring that all of the relevant facts [are] sufficiently developed
and considered.
(quoting Hankerson v. Harriss, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1980), quoting Gold
v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972) (internal
quotations omitted)).
104. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 67.
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factual record. 106  Accordingly, the interventions described in the
preceding section' 0 7 would have to be imported here as a mandated
component of the AL's duty to develop the factual record.
Similarly, judicial techniques used by judges in the inquisitorial
model followed in most jurisdictions outside of the United States,
Great Britain, and other countries that have adopted the English
common law system could provide guidance for ALJs in devising
methods and interventions by which to fully develop the record.
1°
Of course, adopting aspects of a judicial model that is largely
unknown to most of us trained in the Anglo-American system is
106. See, e.g., supra notes 102-103 and cases cited there; see also Paul R.
Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 679, 704-09 (2002) (documenting reversal rates of more than 50% for Social
Security administrative law judge disability determinations, but arguing that this
reversal rate is in part explainable by courts engaging in a too close review of the
factual record under a substantial evidence standard of review); Wolfe, supra note
32, at 346 ("Adversarial courts sitting in review of those acting within the unique
paradigm of the administrative judiciary may be tempted to judge too quickly,
either attributing negative consequences to judicial activity, or, conversely, having
accepted the 'active' role of the administrative law judge, criticize unduly a
perceived lack of sufficient activity."). But see Anthony Taibi, Politics and Due
Process: The Rhetoric of Social Security Disability Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 913
(1990) (arguing that judicial timidity restrains judges from identifying and
rectifying underlying systemic flaws which result in wrong decisions and injury to
personal dignity and autonomy). Regulatory changes promulgated by the SSA in
2006 may address some of the concerns raised by Verkuil and Wolfe, but they in
no way address the failure of ALJs to develop the record for pro se litigants. Frank
S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security
Administration's New Disability Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising
Reform, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 235 (2007) (describing terms of new regulations).
107. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 41:
In this [inquisitorial] system, the professionally trained judge
takes an activist role and ensures a solution based on the merits
of the case by calling witnesses, asking most of the questions,
and conducting hearings .... Narrative testimony is invited and,
with some exceptions, most evidence offered by the parties is
admitted .... With greater judicial involvement in fact finding,
"the threat of one-sided distortions of misinformation appears
less immediate, and the need to subject means of proof to testing
becomes less compelling." (citation omitted).
STRIER, supra note 6, at 16 ("[T]he judge controls and conducts the court's
investigation, calling witnesses and establishing the scope of the inquiry.").
unacceptable to some commentators, even as applied to ALJs,
including to Social Security ALJs. 1°9 Nevertheless, defenses of the
Anglo-American approach against incursions of inquisitorial-based
reforms are rooted in the adversarial system's presumption or at least
a preference that a zealous lawyer will represent each party, even at
administrative hearings. Indeed, the Goldberg Court, although not
finding that legal representation at an administrative hearing was
constitutionally required, nevertheless acknowledged that "The right
to be heard would be, in many case, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel .... Counsel can help
delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly
manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the
interests of the recipient."' '
0
109. See, e.g., Litigant's Struggle, supra note 1, at 53 ("[W]e would be
sacrificing some important elements of popular control over the legal system.")
(quoting DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 103 (1988)
[hereinafter LUBAN]); see also LUBAN, supra, at 98 (noting that "despite its
numerous attractions, the German [inquisitorial] procedure requires other changes
in the legal system and the nexus of values enveloping it that would make the
trade-off unacceptable"); Wolfe, supra note 32, at 332-45 (arguing that the current
inquisitorial role of the Social Security ALJ in that system's single party hearings
encourages the ALJ to became an advocate for a position contrary to the claimant's
and affects the ALJ's objectivity). See also Dwyer, supra note 101, passim
(describing opposition to an inquisitorial approach at administrative hearings).
110. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). See also Wolfe, supra note 32, at 346-47 (presuming that the
problem for the active ALJ is "How ... the [administrative law] judge, trained and
experienced in the adversarial system of justice, perceive[s] her active role? How
does she maintain the requisite jurisprudential distance necessary to independent
decision making when required to respond to an adversarial lawyer, unchecked by
an opposing party?" Id. (emphasis added)). See more generally LUBAN, supra note
109, at 239-41 (arguing that access to the adversary system and the rules by which
that system functions presume representation by an attorney). Professor Luban,
although a staunch defender of the adversarial system against inquisitorial-based
reforms, further notes that our adversarial system not only presumes representation
by a lawyer, but is constructed to require such representation.
The design of a legal system that cannot be operated by
laypeople is surely the result of state decisions, indeed, of the
accretion of hundreds of millions of state decisions. Moreover,
the inability of poor people to afford lawyers is also the result of
choices made by the state, both formalistically as a matter of law
and also as a matter of plain fact....
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However, a significant number of litigants appearing in
administrative hearings are and will be pro se and, thus, will not have
such help in presenting their cases. Accordingly, the incorporation of
at least some aspects of the inquisitorial model, primarily by
enhancing the role of the ALJ in developing the factual record in an
orderly manner, and in delineating the issues to be resolved at the
hearing, and in identifying and applying controlling law, is essential
if the pro se litigant is to be afforded a full and fair due process
hearing.
In the French civil (and criminal) systems, the judge has the
responsibility for fact gathering, including developing facts pre-trial
and at trial by questioning witnesses.111 As in most administrative
proceedings, discovery by the parties in the French system is
extremely limited. Rather, the judge directs the development of the
factual and legal issues in the case, and fixes time limits.
112
[T]he selective exclusion of the poor from the legal system
does not simply fail to confer an advantage on them-it actively
injures them.
Id. at 246-47. Professor Luban's solution to this constitutional infirmity is
limited to the deregulation of some routine legal services, mandatory pro bono
representation, and funding of legal services, all of which preserve the lawyer-
centric and resulting judicial passivity models of our judicial system, and provide
little relief for those who, in spite of these reforms, will appear at administrative
hearings and trials without attorneys.
111. I am deeply indebted in this section to a paper by Professor Anne
Moynihan, The French Judiciary (1996) (prepared for the Housing Court
Committee, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, describing that
system's inquisitorial model and discussing its applicability to the United States
civil system and New York City's Housing Court in particular). Professor
Moynihan, a respected clinical professor at Fordham Law School, recently met an
untimely death. In 1987, she hired me right out of law school as a trial attorney for
the Legal Aid Society and profoundly affected my development as a lawyer and a
teacher. I dedicate this section of this Article to her memory. See also Nicolas
Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American
Perspective, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57 (1994); C.N. Ngwasiri, The Role of the Judge in
French Civil Proceedings, CIV. JUST. Q. 169 (April 1990); Richard S. Frase,
Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do The
French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care? 78 CAL. L. REV.
539 (1990); James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J.
COMP. L. 459 (1986); Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French
Experience, 42 MD. L. REv. 131 (1983).
112. Moynihan, supra note 111. For a summary of similar elements in the
Obviously, the whole cloth importation of such a civil code-based
inquisitorial approach raises significant statutory, administrative and
ethical issues. 3 In addition, such an importation could give rise to
practical considerations, since, for example, the French system relies
on fairly well-developed dossiers to educate the judge regarding the
factual and legal issues that she is expected to develop and on which
she must rule. There are also theoretical considerations of such an
importation given, for example, the almost exclusive reliance in the
French system on documentary evidence due to a fundamental
devaluation of the trustworthiness of testimony. 1 4  Nevertheless,
some familiarity with a judicial system in which the judge plays a
German system, see LUBAN, supra note 109, at 94-97; see also STRIER, supra
note 62, at 213-18 (comparing the French and German systems). Compare Mirjan
Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and
Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 839, 841-44 (1997) (describing the
limits on the inquisitorial judge's fact finding powers, but noting that those powers
exceed those of the Anglo-American judge, particularly the former's "monopoly of
witness' examination."). Id. at 843-44.
113. Moynihan, supra note 11, at 2; see also LUBAN, supra note 109.
Professor Damaska succinctly and compellingly outlines the problems of grafting
whole cloth the active role of the inquisitorial judge onto our adversarial system.
See supra note 112, at 841-42. However, her concerns about importing aspects of
the inquisitorial judge model presume the continuing dominance of adversarial
attorneys. "[N]o matter how momentous this reform appears at first blush, it would
fail to put an end to the decisive role partisan counsel play in the tapping of
information sources. Without further changes, the reform would only make the
examination of evidence less efficient than it is under the present arrangements."
Id. at 849-50. Whatever the merit of such concerns regarding adversarial trials and
hearings involving attorneys, Damaska's concerns are of less moment to the pro se
litigant who has only the ALJ to assist her in presenting her facts and identifying
the legal issues to be determined in order to be assured her due process right to a
full and fair hearing.
114. Beardsley, supra note 111, at 467, 469-70, 480 (claiming that the French
system's almost exclusive reliance on documentary evidence results in "fact
avoidance," i.e., the failure of the judge to use the full range of powers and
methods available to her to develop the factual record). In fact, an over reliance on
documentary evidence might severely prejudice a pro se litigant at an
administrative hearing. Thus, that aspect of the French system may be not only
theoretically, but also practically unsuitable both to the American system in
general, but also to the goal of assisting the pro se litigant in presenting her
narrative evidence at an administrative hearing, unless the ALJ fulfills her duty to
develop the record and obtain all necessary documentary evidence on the pro se's
behalf.
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significant fact development role, particularly during the phase of the
trial called the enqute,115 may counter a reflexive rejection of such a
judicial role simply because Anglo-American ALJs and advocates
have little knowledge of or exposure to systems other than our own
adversarial-based one.1 1
6
115. Id. at 478-79:
In the enqu~te the witness is asked by the magistrate to state
discursively what he knows about the case. He will be
interrupted from time to time by the magistrate either so that
specific questions may be put or to enable the magistrate to
dictate to his clerk (greffier) a summary of what the witness has
said.... During this exercise the lawyers are seated in the back
of the room, out of the line of sight of the witness, and are only
asked at the end of the enqute if there are other questions which
they would like to have the investigating magistrate [not the
lawyer] put to the witness. The magistrate may decide not to
restate the question; he may simply ask the witness to respond or
to clarify his earlier statements. There is, however, none of the
psychological pressure associated with cross-examination as
practiced in common law procedure. Immediately upon the end
of the interrogation, the magistrate's summary is handed to the
witness for review and signature. (emphasis added).
See also Ngwasiri, supra note 111, at 176-85.
116. Indeed, Professor Luban's rejection of inquisitorial-based reforms is
premised primarily on what he calls "a pragmatic argument: if a social institution
does a reasonable enough job of its sort that the costs of replacing it outweigh the
benefits, and if we need that sort of job done, we should stay with what we have."
LUBAN, supra note 109, at 92. However, as Professor Luban acknowledges, the
system we have "cannot be operated by laypeople." Id. at 246. Thus, even on a
pragmatic analysis, the present system does not do "a reasonable enough job" for
pro se litigants and should be changed accordingly. As Professor Strier has noted,
"What is prevalent is not necessarily what is functional or fair. We must be chary
of a misplaced complacency that our trial procedures are optimal, and therefore
inviolable. The adversary system is not sacrosanct. By eschewing labels, we can
bring to our table the option to adopt the best features of foreign systems." STRiER,
supra note 62, at 287. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that "Adversarial
ideology has failed. The adversary system is transforming itself into a more
inquisitorial, less individualistic methodology even as apologists debate the various
justifications for adversarial adjudication. The transformation seems to be bringing
about a system that is more effective at fairly complex fact-finding, socially
significant rule-making, and behavior-modifying litigation. The less
individualistic, more communitarian ethic that is reflected in the transformation
should be recognized and encouraged. That recognition may entail abandoning
adversarial ideology, but a focus on our goals and values is more helpful in
These preliminary explorations suggest that a more
comprehensive investigation of such systems beyond the brief
summary provided here may suggest additional means by which the
role of the AU can be enhanced to meet the challenge of pro se
litigants in administrative hearings." 7 One should investigate and
evaluate the importation of at least some aspects of such a fully
developed inquisitorial role for an AU." 8  For example, Professor
Strier has proposed a "middle ground" approach to expanding the
inquisitorial role of judges even during trials involving attorneys in
terms familiar to those versed in the adversarial model:
To gain the benefits of independent, judicial
questioning during trial, we need not replace purely
adversarial evidence gathering with the judge-
dominated model of the inquisitorial system. An
acceptable middle ground could be the same
allocation of interrogating power employed during our
evaluating and modifying our adjudicatory system than any rigid ideology could
be." Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System,
64 IND. L.J. 301, 355 (1989).
117. "An understanding of the inquisitorial system trial is essential to a
broader appreciation of the adversary system. Each system puts the other in
context, setting a baseline for comparison and contrast of the representative
features." STRIER, supra note 62, at 16.
118. As Strier has explained:
I do not suggest wholesale adoption of the inquisitorial
philosophy that a trial is a vehicle for the implementation of state
policy. Instead, I prescribe a departure from our self-imposed
enslavement to the principle that (except for the relatively rare
jury nullification) procedure is all-important in trial and outcome
is irrelevant. We will not compromise the integrity of our trial
system if we occasionally drop the blindfold of Justice to avert
gross inequities. If we do not, if we continue to abide by a blind,
quasi-religious faith in adversary procedure, then the means to
justice will have swallowed the ends.
Id. at 283
Dwyer, supra note 101, at ("the [inquisitorial] procedure I adopt must be fair and
give both parties natural justice. A course which will allow the [administrative]
Tribunal to be better informed as to relevant facts .. .does not conflict with the
principles of fairness or natural justice."). But see Damaska, supra note 112
(describing the unintended negative consequences that could result from such a
piecemeal or pastiche approach).
Fall 2007 A Full and Fair Hearing
490 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
voir dire .... [T]he judge might conduct the initial
interrogation, after which the attorneys would be free
to probe for additional details. But the judge could
always ask supplemental questions which an
incompetent or marginally competent attorney
neglects to pose. The occasional need for this judicial
"safety net" protection escapes few who are familiar
with adversary system trials.1 9
Adapting this more active role to hearings involving pro se litigants
could significantly assist the pro se litigant in developing the factual
record.
In addition to problems in developing the factual record, pro se
litigants also face a daunting challenge in articulating a legal
framework or theory of the case in which the merits of their claim or
defense can be evaluated. 120 Thus, it could be productive to adapt the
approach in German civil actions in which the "court's duty to
discover the truth is matched by a cognate responsibility to ascertain
and apply the law without prompting from the parties. In essence,
the court seeks to ensure a decision based on the merits of the
case." 121 Although this approach may seem at odds with the judge's
role within the adversary system, 122 it is not unlike the role played by
a judge in Small Claims court, who must not only apply substantive
law to the facts presented by the pro se parties, but must also identify
the substantive law to be applied to the facts since a Small Claims
judge does not have the benefit of lawyers to brief the law. 123
Similarly, ALJs regularly explain for attorneys and pro se litigants
119. STRIER, supra note 62, at 265.
120. See supra notes 77, 82, and 85.
121. STRIER, supra note 62, at 217 (emphasis added).
122. Id. (noting that "A contrary dynamic obtains in the adversary system.
The general premise of adversary procedure is that the court has no independent
knowledge of the law and must therefore be informed of it by argument.").
123. See Lebovits, supra note 86, at 9 (establishing that small claims judge is
required to adhere strictly to the requirements of substantive law and may not
merely speculate or compromise under the guise of doing substantial justice).
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"what the case is about and the procedures to be followed. 2 4 Thus,
the reforms proposed here are related in kind to the duty that many
ALJs already have to develop the record, especially for pro se
litigants.
However, given the difficulty that ALJs schooled in the adversary
model have in implementing such an active judicial role, I proposed
in Part II.B that ALJs take much fuller advantage of the freedom they
have from evidentiary rules and from the traditional passive role of a
judge in our system, and suggested techniques by which they might
actualize those freedoms in assisting pro se litigants. What I am
proposing in this section is that ALJs who already have a duty to
develop the record do so in a more comprehensive and systematic
way, adopting and adapting the techniques of an inquisitorial model
of adjudication. In order to effectuate this more comprehensive and
systematic inquisitorial approach, the active role of the ALJ must be
viewed as extending beyond merely asking a few more questions of
the pro se litigant.'25 Rather, an inquisitorial approach involves a
thoroughgoing re-imaging of the role of the ALJ throughout (and,
indeed, even before) the hearing as the active seeker of truth and the
doer of justice in the matter before her.'26
In an article in this Journal, Senior Member Dwyer provides both
a rationale for using such an inquisitorial model in administrative
hearings, particularly where unrepresented litigants are involved, and
extrapolates from her own first hand experience how such a role
would translate into specific, concrete techniques for ALJs to use
both in developing the factual record for pro se litigants and in
ascertaining and applying the law relevant to the claims raised by
those facts.' 27 "[W]here ... a matter proceeds to a hearing ... the
Court or Tribunal should, in order to do justice between the parties,
see the ascertainment of truth as its aim in making findings of
124. Manual, supra note 8, at 71; Dwyer, supra note 101, at 115 ("Both courts
and tribunals today recognize their duty to assist unrepresented litigants by
explaining to them the issues as to which they will need to call evidence .. .
125. See, e.g., Schoenberger, supra note 32 (describing an active ALJ as one
who asks questions, but emphasizing that questioning must be limited); see also
supra notes 41, 43 and 46 (same).
126. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
127. Dwyer, supra note 101.
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contested facts ... in so far as I suggest the use of inquisitorial
procedures I do so because I believe they will assist at the aim of
getting at the truth."' 28 To that end, Dwyer describes in detail and
with specific reference to cases over which she has presided the
following interventions and techniques which, I submit, can be
adapted to U.S. administrative hearings: (1) the ALJ should help
formulate the legal issues which must or should be resolved, even if
the parties fail to raise them or if they stipulate a resolution contrary
to controlling law;129 (2) the ALJ should determine whether
(additional) witnesses should be called in order to fully develop the
record; 130 (3) the ALJ should identify for the parties what necessary
information is lacking in the record and instruct them to obtain such
information and assist them in doing so if necessary or, in appropriate
cases, obtain the information herself;131 (4) the ALJ should assist and
question unrepresented litigants. 32 Dwyer argues that by using these
inquisitorial techniques, the administrative decision maker will have
before her all of the information necessary on which to make a fair
and just decision, concluding that "Good administration requires no
less."'133 I propose that careful reflection on Senior Member Dwyer's
analysis and examples might be a fruitful place for ALJ's to begin as
they grapple with the inclusion of more inquisitorial methods into
their hearing practices in order to assist pro se litigants.
Finally, it should be repeated that contrary to the concerns
expressed by some commentators, adopting the more active,
inquisitorial role for ALJs proposed here need not compromise
judicial impartiality and fairness. 134 Judges in inquisitorial systems
128. Id. at 89-90 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 97-102.
130. Id. at 103-105.
131. Id. at 105-115.
132. Id. at 115-20.
133. Id. at 137.
134. See Engler, supra note 1, at 2023-24 (summarizing concerns about
appearance of partiality if a judge assists a pro se litigant); see also Litigant's
Struggle, supra note 6, at 42-44; see also STRIER, supra note 62, at 37
(summarizing impartiality concerns arising from a judge's taking a more active role
in fact finding); Wolfe, supra note 32, at 301-07 (same regarding Social Security
ALJs).
engage in a mandated active role without a loss of impartiality.'
35
Social Security ALJs, who also develop the factual record and
determine which law is applicable to the cases before them, can do so
without any loss of an appearance of fairness.' 36 As described above,
techniques of questioning and explanation exist by which ALJs can
take a more active role in assisting pro se litigants without giving rise
to concerns about an appearance or, indeed, the reality of
partiality. 13
7
III. CONCLUSION
The proposals set forth above challenge our received traditions of
judicial passivity and impartiality, narrowly understood. These
135. STRIER, supra note 62, at 83-84, 266-67; but see LUBAN, supra note
109, at 99 (describing the dominance of prosecutors over the examining magistrate
in the pre-trial phase in the French criminal system) (citing Tomlinson, supra note
I11, at 150-64).
136. Engler, supra note 3, at 2018:
The precedents from small claims courts and administrative
agencies serve as an important reminder that impartiality does
not require judges to be passive. Like other judges, small claims
judges must remain impartial. ALJs in Social Security, welfare,
and unemployment benefits cases must also remain impartial.
Judges may therefore be active in assisting unrepresented
litigants without compromising their impartiality. (citations
omitted).
STRIER, supra note 62, at 84:
Even within the United States, the trial judge's passivity is
unique among those serving in formal dispute resolution roles.
In administrative hearings . . . arbitrators play an active role
without the loss of impartiality. In collective bargaining, federal
mediators rescue legions of sessions from stalemate. And at the
local and private sector levels, conciliators of all kind
successfully function as neutral but active third-party facilitators
in quasi-judicial roles. Clearly, impartiality and passivity are not
necessarily corollaries.
Dwyer, supra note 101, at 97 ("An [inquisitorial] course which will allow the
Tribunal to be better informed as to relevant facts, while allowing the parties to
cross-examine any additional witnesses or make submissions about additional
material does not conflict with the principles of fairness and natural justice.") But
see Wolfe, supra note 32, at 301-07 (arguing that the Social Security ALJ's duty to
develop the record undermines impartiality).
137. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
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traditions dramatically limit the role played by many ALJs in
assuring access to justice for pro se litigants, even in settings that are
purportedly nonadversarial and not bound the rules of evidence, and
even where the AU is under a duty to develop the record. The
consequences of this circumscription are devastating for a pro se
litigant. Although the ALJ may try to explain procedures, relax
evidentiary rules if they are applicable, or even allow to a limited
degree testimony in narrative form, the pro se litigant is left to figure
out on her own when she has said enough to meet a legal standard
regarding which she is largely ignorant.
Accordingly, I have proposed, as have other commentators, a
more active, inquisitorial-based role for ALJs. I submit that most of
the models of such judicial intervention outlined above can be
incorporated to some extent into the present system. However, the
constitutional infirmity of the present system, which denies a full and
fair hearing and, thus, equal access to justice to many pro se litigants,
requires that we consider more far-reaching departures from the
received construction of judicial role. Thus, I submit that at least
three additional reforms, which may require statutory, administrative
or ethical reforms, are required: (1) jettisoning, in whole or in part,
evidentiary rules in administrative fora where they are currently
imposed either by rule or in practice, and (2) placing an affirmative
duty on all ALJs to develop the factual record, as is currently the rule
in Social Security disability hearings, and to determine and apply
relevant substantive law. In addition, I submit that both of those
approaches will have little effect unless (3) the AU is required to
employ at least some of the inquisitorial approaches and techniques
for assisting and questioning pro se litigants described above in Part
II.B and C.
In spite of the efforts of dedicated and well-intentioned ALJs and
administrators, the current system can hardly be called a law-based
system for pro se litigants. The proposals developed in this paper
attempt to find interventions by which an AU can assist the pro se
litigant in presenting both the nature of the legal conflict and the facts
needed to adjudicate that conflict based on applicable substantive
law. In that way, an AU can more truly be said to be a person who
is presiding over a system ruled by law and not by the accidents of
status or legal representation. Thus, the AU will have gone a long
way in making the administrative adjudicatory system respond to its
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fundamental constitutional and judicial task of providing full and fair
hearings for pro se litigants, thus assuring them equal access to
justice.
